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I. Introduction 
“Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; di-
vinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his en-
emy’s fate.” 1 
 
In the theater of war, the “Internet Age” has shifted the 
scenery.  The advent and global expansion of this new medium 
may prove to be the fastest and most powerful technological 
revolution in humanity’s history.2  It has created a global at-
mosphere in flux, “characterized by interdependence, uncer-
tainty, complexity, and continual change.”3  Because cyber-
space passes electronically through geopolitical and natural 
boundaries, electronic payloads ‘launched’ into cyberspace en-
joy instantaneous deployment.4  Moreover, the threats posed by 
world conflicts in cyberspace are an imminent reality; with the 
advent of “the internet of things,” hackers can remotely control 
connected devices, including motor vehicles traveling at full 
speed.5  It is plausible that a state or group engaged in a cyber 
                                                          
1 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 97 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1971). 
2 See Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law 3 (UNIDIR Re-
sources 2011), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-
international-law-382.pdf (“[T]he advent and global expansion of the Internet 
may prove to become the fastest and most powerful technological revolution 
in the history of mankind.”). 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 
OPERATIONS 1 (2006). 
4 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 5.  
5 See Mark Pesce, The Internet of things is great until it blows up your 
house, THE REGISTER (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/17/the_internet_of_things_is_great_unti
l_it_blows_up_your_house/ (noting that with 33 billion connected devices pro-
jected by 2020, a hacked connected device can be problematic, because “33 
billion connected devices means 33 billion attack surfaces, each with their 
own exploits, zero day attacks, weaknesses and vulnerabilities.”); see also 
Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in 
it, WIRED (Jul. 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-
remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ (reporting on a test performed by hackers near 
St. Louis on a motor vehicle traveling at 70 m.p.h.:  “As the two hackers re-
motely toyed with the air-conditioning, radio, and windshield wipers, I men-
tally congratulated myself on my courage under pressure. That’s when they 
cut the transmission.”).  Some experts suggest that any number of otherwise 
benign devices are susceptible to hacking.  See, e.g., Brian Wheeler, Toys 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/6
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conflict could remotely light up tens of thousands of ovens or 
furnaces in a military base or an urban center, effectively de-
stroying a target without firing a missile or mobilizing a war-
plane.6  In now-declassified documents, the United States mili-
tary has characterized a new dimension in warfare:  “The 
Cyberspace Domain,” which may likely extend into outer 
space.7 The U.S. military defines this domain as 
“[c]haracterized by the use of electronics and the electromag-
netic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via net-
worked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”8   
A recently suggested definition of a “cyber-attack” refers to 
it as “[a]ny action taken to undermine the functions of a com-
puter network for a political or national security purpose.”9  
The definition is hardly a settled one, however; many States 
and scholars have defined “cyber-attack” more broadly or nar-
rowly.10 
                                                          
could be used as spying devices, MPs told, BBC News (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35043521 (noting experts’ concerns 
about “smart toys” given that “anything that connected to the internet could 
‘in theory’ be hacked into,” including driverless cars or household appliances).  
6 See Pesce, supra note 5 (noting that “when you go away on a fortnight’s 
holidays, and someone hacks into your oven, turns the gas on, waits 36 hours, 
then lights the pilot, well, then you’ve got a problem. A much worse problem 
if you happen to be at home at the time. Your oven could gas you in your 
sleep.”). 
7 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 3 (positing the existence of the “Cyber-
space Domain”); Chris Bowlby, Could a war in space really happen?, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35130478 (noting 
that “[c]yber attacks on military satellites are another concern” and that 
“[t]here are now more incentives for a potential adversary, such as China, to 
attack satellites or disable them as part of a conventional conflict … they 
know full well that space capabilities are at the core of the US's ability to pro-
ject power.”). 
8 Id. 
9 Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
817, 826 (2012). 
10 See, e.g., Reese Nguyen, Comment, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the 
Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1088 (2013) (“rather than defin-
ing ‘cyber attack’ by the object of attack, it makes more sense to define the 
term by the instrument of attack. Under this reading, the term ‘cyber attack’ 
may describe the use of cyber operations as a weapon or form of attack, with 
the word ‘cyber’ characterizing the mode of assault. Just as an ‘air assault’ 
denotes a military attack using aircraft, or as an ‘amphibious assault’ denotes 
an assault by land and sea executed on a hostile shore, a ‘cyber attack’ can 
denote an attack executed by means of a computer or computer network.  
Here, a cyber attack is an instrument or method of attack, a weapon or capa-
3
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While “the notion of ‘armed attack’ necessarily implies the 
use of a weapon,”11 the members of armed forces seldom effec-
tuate cyber-attacks exclusively in cyber operations.12  In Octo-
ber of 2014, hackers thought to be working for the Russian 
government breached White House computer networks, result-
ing in temporary service disruptions.13  Earlier in 2014, a group 
using the moniker “Lizard Squad” launched a series of denial-
of-service attacks against the Vatican and several online gam-
ing sites;14 their acts culminated in the ‘tweeting’ of a false 
bomb threat, resulting in the diversion of American Airlines 
Flight 362, traveling from Dallas to San Diego.15  Shortly 
thereafter, the group claimed that it took its actions in support 
                                                          
bility that is used to effectuate a particular objective.”); Phillip Pool, War of 
the Cyber World: The Law of Cyber Warfare, 47 INT’L LAW. 299, 309 (2013) 
(noting the broad definition proffered in the Shanghai Cooperation, an 
agreement signed by Russia, China, and other central Asian countries, defin-
ing cyber warfare more expansively by including “information war,” meaning 
a “mass psychological brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as well 
as to force the state to take decisions in the interest of an opposing party.”); 
Erki Kodar, Applying the Law of Armed Conflict to Cyber Attacks:  From the 
Martens Clause to Additional Protocol I, 15 ENDC PROCEEDINGS 107, 107-08 
(2012),  http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_5_Kodar.pdf (noting the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s narrower definition, “actions taken through the 
use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and the 
networks themselves.”).  
11 Melzer, supra note 2, at 13. 
12 Kodar, supra note 10, at 124. 
13 Ellen Nakashima, Hackers breach some White House computers, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-
5ef7-11e4-91f7-
5d89b5e8c251_story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_t
erm=*Morning%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_MorningBrief-
%20RD%20PROMO10.29.14 (noting, in addition, a previous operation termed 
“Buckshot Yankee,”  allegedly perpetrated by the Russian intelligence ser-
vice, that breached U.S. military classified networks in 2008).  
14 Alyssa Newcomb, Lizard Squad: Who Is the Group Claiming Respon-
sibility for High Profile Hacks? ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2014, 1:38 PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/lizard-squad-group-claiming-responsibility-
high-profile-hacks/story?id=25129458. 
15 Hayley Tsukayama, Sony says no customer information was taken in 
online attack, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/25/sony-says-
no-customer-information-was-taken-in-online-attack/. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/6
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of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL).16  While 
any direct relationship between Lizard Squad and ISIL is high-
ly unlikely,17 their attack is not the only one to have planted 
the ISIL flag in cyberspace.  In February of 2015, a group de-
claring support for ISIL jihadists hacked Newsweek’s twitter 
account, releasing several military documents claimed to be of 
a classified nature.18  Notably, ISIL regularly utilizes online 
platforms to recruit fighters,19 and over time, cyber operations 
by the group or its supporters have gotten bolder.  In 2015, a 
dedicated cyber unit identifying as the “CyberCaliphate” 
hacked the Twitter account of the United States Central Com-
mand.20  Another group, the “ISIS Cyber Army,” targeted fifty-
one American websites, defacing them with the ISIL flag.21 
In December of 2014, the North Korean government 
                                                          
16 Lizard Squad (@Lizard Squad), TWITTER, (Aug. 24, 2014, 8:03 AM), 
https://twitter.com/LizardSquad/status/503558145784815619 (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2014, 7:01 pm) (“Today we planted the ISIS flag on @Sony’s servers 
#ISIS #jihad”) (Twitter has since suspended this particular Lizard Squad Ac-
count).  
17 See Nakashima, supra note 13 (noting, while unable to confirm Rus-
sia’s responsibility for the attack, that sources suggested “the nature of the 
target is consistent with a state-sponsored campaign.”); Tsukayama, supra 
note 15 (noting that “there was no official information” on whether a substan-
tiated connection between Lizard Squad and ISIS existed).  However, at least 
some Lizard Squad members likely have anti-western leanings in tandem 
with those espoused by ISIS.  See Neha Singh, US officials start probe as 
hackers claim leaking data about FBI employees, ibtimes.co.in (Feb. 9, 2016 
16:06 PM IST), http://m.ibtimes.co.in/us-officials-start-probe-hackers-claim-
leaking-data-about-fbi-employees-666286 (noting that a former member of 
Lizard Squad is reported to have had involvement in the leaking of some 
29,000 FBI and DHS employees’ personal information; reporting also that 
“before allegedly hacking into the data of FBI and DHS employees, the hack-
ers tweeted, ‘When will the US government reali[z]e we won't stop until they 
cut relations with Israel.’”). 
18 Newsweek is latest victim of the ‘Cybercaliphate’, I24 NEWS (Feb. 10, 
2015: 9:45 PM), http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/technology/60697-150210-
newsweek-is-latest-victim-of-the-cybercaliphate. 
19 See, e.g., ISIS recruits fighters through powerful online campaign, 
CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2014: 6:55 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-uses-
social-media-to-recruit-western-allies/. 
20 Michael Martinez, Cyberwar: CyberCaliphate targets U.S. military 
spouses; Anonymous hits ISIS, CNN (last updated Feb. 11, 2015, 7:50 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/10/us/isis-cybercaliphate-attacks-cyber-battles/. 
21 ISIS Cyber Unit Announces More Hacks, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 
BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015), http://blog.adl.org/international/isis-cyber-unit-
announces-more-hacks. 
5
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matched these groups’ opening salvo tenfold by hacking into 
Sony Pictures’ networks as retaliation for the film company’s 
intended release of The Interview,22 a film depicting the killing 
of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.23 The rogue state’s 
hackers damaged Sony Pictures’ network infrastructure so bad-
ly that Sony workers had to revert to using fax machines to 
communicate.24  The White House’s speedy attribution of the 
Sony Pictures hack to agents of the North Korean government 
was only possible due to metadata and other evidence gathered 
by the United States government beginning in 2010, when the 
National Security Agency used “early warning radar” software 
to monitor North Korea’s activities.25  The devastating effect on 
Sony Pictures from that relatively crude attack led the compa-
ny’s CEO to describe the hack as “the worst cyberattack in U.S. 
history.”26  While that claim may be dubious given the short-
comings of Sony’s own network and the international standard 
for a cyber-attack, the operation was unprecedented in that a 
sovereign state leveraged the attack in order to achieve a very 
non-cyber aim, namely, the cancellation of a film release.27  In 
response to this and other attacks like it in recent years, the 
Obama Administration announced the creation of a new agen-
cy, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC), 
modeled on the National Counterterrorism Center, at the Wil-
son Center in Washington.28 
                                                          
22 THE INTERVIEW (Sony Pictures 2014). 
23 Michael Cieply, ‘The Interview’ Brings In $15 Million on Web, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/media/the-interview-comes-to-
itunes-store.html. 
24 Aarti Shahani, Is Sony Hack Really ‘The Worst’ In U.S. History, As 
CEO Claims? NPR.ORG (Dec. 23, 2014, 5:05 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/12/23/372603286/is-sony-
hack-really-the-worst-in-u-s-history-as-ceo-claims. 
25 David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean 
Networks Before Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-korean-
networks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html. 
26 Shahani, supra note 24. 
27 Roy Isacowitz, Despite all the publicity, the Sony hack was small-time; 
much worse is yet to come, HAARETZ (Dec. 25, 2014, 8:24 PM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/.premium-1.633813. 
28 Obama administration announces new cybersecurity agency, FOX NEWS 
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/02/10/obama-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/6
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Regardless of whether victims or independent observers 
successfully identify the source of a cyber-attack, the effects of 
such an attack are pervasive, insidious, and borderless.  Those 
that perpetrate cyber-attacks may do so from virtually any-
where with Internet access, and may reach to virtually any-
where with Internet access.  Belligerent states increasingly 
employ private contractors and civilian employees in a variety 
of functions, including cyber operations roles.29  In such an en-
vironment, where the ‘fog of war’ pervades every bit and byte of 
the virtual battlefield, the international community must revis-
it the definition of ‘combatant’ as applied to cyber-attacks if it 
wishes to ensure continued global peace and security. 
Cyber-attacks take many forms, only some of which are 
applicable to the law of war.30  This Comment discusses only 
those attacks sponsored by a government or non-state entity 
that have the goal of affecting morale or gaining political ad-
vantage, or those attacks amounting to tactical strikes on state 
or civilian infrastructure.  In that vein, this Comment proposes 
the adoption of a new legal framework for determining the 
threshold that marks a participant in such a cyber-attack as a 
“cyber-combatant” by adapting the framework set by the Gene-
va Conventions and existing custom.  This definition should 
encompass cyber-attacks perpetrated by states, unrecognized 
states, and non-state groups.  It should set the rules of en-
gagement for cyber-attacks and operations conducted for politi-
cal advantage, morale boost, and tactical purposes. 
Whether they act on the orders or in support of States or 
non-state groups, those perpetrating cyber-attacks that have 
material effects upon the morale or infrastructure of a sover-
eign nation during armed conflict should be treated as “com-
batants” for purposes of international law, and the legality of 
                                                          
administration-to-announce-new-cybersecurity-agency/. 
29 Melzer, supra note 2, at 34. 
30 See id. at 22 (“[S]ecurity threats emanating from cyberspace which do 
not reach the threshold of armed conflict can be described as ‘cyber crime’, 
‘cyber operations,’ ‘cyber policing’ or, where appropriate, as ‘cyberterrorism’ 
or ‘cyber piracy’, but should not be referred to with terminology inviting 
doubt and uncertainty as to the applicability of the law of armed conflict.”).  
This Comment will approach issues of attacks related to cyber-warfare and, 
to a lesser extent, cyber-terrorism, as applied to legal issues in direct relation 
to international humanitarian law. 
7
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their actions should be defined.  Because the standard govern-
ing what constitutes a lawful combatant under any reasonable 
reading of the Geneva Conventions31 is muddled as applied to 
combatants in cyber-warfare as presently conducted, this paper 
takes the position that under present custom, cyber-
combatants may likely be effectively considered illegal combat-
ants under International Law. 
Part II of this Comment provides a framework for defining 
“cyber-combatants,” reviewing the traditionally accepted defi-
nition of “combatants” under the Geneva Conventions and cus-
tomary international law as restated through the Tallinn Man-
ual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.32  
Part III explores the alleged cyber-operations of sovereign 
States, including Israel’s C4i Cyber Warfare Unit and The 
United States’ USCYBERCOM and its sister agencies, some or 
all of which may have been responsible for the Stuxnet attack 
on Iran; Russia’s coordinated cyber-attacks perpetrated during 
its war with Georgia in 2008 and in the conflict in Ukraine in 
2014 and 2015; and China’s PLA Unit 61398.  Part IV intro-
duces the unique problem posed by cyber-attacks perpetrated 
by agents of unrecognized states and organized terrorist groups 
such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.  Finally, Part V concludes by pro-
posing alternative definitions for cyber-attacks, and consequen-
tially, cyber-combatants. 
II. The present status of the Law of Cyber-Warfare  
                                                          
31 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into 
force Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinaf-
ter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T 3217, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/375?OpenDocument [hereinaf-
ter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into force Feb. 2, 
1956) 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention]. 
32 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2013). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/6
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International treaty and custom governing cyber-warfare 
are in a state of evolution.33  At present, broad international 
dialogue on the interpretation and application of existing rules 
and principles of international law to cyber-warfare are virtual-
ly non-existent.34  The activities that would define the nature 
and character of ‘cyber-combatants’ thus find their definition in 
existing international humanitarian law (jus in bello), which 
“sets forth the rules of the game; the rules under which hostili-
ties can be carried out.”35 These rules derive primarily from the 
Hague Convention of 1907,36 the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949,37 and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1977.38 These treaties, and the custom derived from them, 
supply the predominant body of provisions related to jus in bel-
lo.39 
Because the Third Geneva Convention is now widely ac-
cepted as customary international law,40 it defines the playing 
                                                          
33 See generally Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International 
Law and the Emergence of Cyber Warfare, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 602 (2011). 
34 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 4. 
35 Thomas Michael McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator 
and Reaper Drones to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Sus-
pected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 270 (2012). 
36 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(Hague Convention (IV)), Annex, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 
539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations], https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195. 
37 See generally supra note 31. 
38 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I) art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter A.P. I]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter A.P. II]. 
39 See McDonnell, supra note 35, at 270; ICRC, What Is International 
Humanitarian Law?, at 1 (July 2004), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf. 
40 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31 (encompassing 196 State 
Parties); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting, at that 
time, that the four Geneva Conventions “have been ratified by more than 180 
nations, including the United States.”); see also Press Release, ICRC, Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 achieve universal acceptance, ICRC Press Release 06/96, 
(Aug. 21, 2006), (acknowledging that “[t]he recent accessions by the Republic  
of  Nauru  and  the  Republic  of  Montenegro  to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions,” resulting in the universal acceptance of the conventions, and remind-
9
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field for States in armed conflict involving two or more States.41  
Article 4 of that Convention defines “combatants” as follows: 
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well 
as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such 
forces. 
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer 
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, be-
longing to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside 
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied provided 
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such orga-
nized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
a. that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
b. that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; 
c. that of carrying arms openly; 
d. that of conducting their operations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war. 
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining 
Power  . . .”42 
The Third Geneva Convention imposed these conditions as 
requirements for “militias and corps of volunteers not forming 
part of the regular armed forces, thus solving one of the most 
difficult questions—that of ‘partisans.’43  The drafting history of 
                                                          
ing “all belligerents of their obligation to abide by the laws of war”); Mike 
Sanderson, The Syrian Crisis and the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 89 INT’L 
L. STUD. 776, 796 (2013) (stating that “all four conventions are now widely 
accepted to have passed in their entirety into customary international law”); 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 814-16 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); Partial 
Award on Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim (Eri. v. Eth.) 42 I.L.M. 1056, 
1083 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003). 
41 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, art. 2. 
42 Id. at art. 4. 
43 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary, III Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 60 
(Jean Pictet, ed., 1960) [hereinafter Commentary on Third Geneva Conven-
tion] (noting that the drafters of Article 4 codified it to resolve the issue posed 
by partisan fighters: “During the Second World War, certain States refused to 
recognize as belligerents combatant units which professed allegiance to a 
Government or authority which these States did not recognize.”). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/6
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the Convention further reveals the flexibility inherent in each 
of the requirements.44  Section (a), which requires the condition 
of command, did not necessarily require a military officer to fill 
the role; the individual asserting command could be a civilian, 
though his competence would be assessed in the same way as 
that of a military commander.45  The drafting history on Sec-
tion (b), which requires “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at 
a distance,” specifies that its distinctive nature requires that 
“the sign must be the same for all the members of any one re-
sistance organization, and must be used only by that organiza-
tion,” but is more nebulous with respect to the issue of recogni-
zance at a distance, leaving it “open to interpretation.”46  
Likewise, the language “carrying arms openly” in Section (c) 
acknowledged that the arms need not be visible and could take 
many forms.47  Finally, the term “the laws and customs of war” 
in Section (d) was purposely kept vague by the Convention’s 
drafters.48  It is apparent from the flexibility of these terms 
that the drafters’ intent was to allow for renewed teleological 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, because advances in 
technology and socio-political norms would necessarily change 
the nature and dynamics of the battlefield.49 
                                                          
44 See id. at 59-61. 
45 Id. at 59. 
46 Id. at 60; see also TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra note 32, at 99 (noting conflict as to 
what would meet the standard of a ‘fixed distinctive sign’ in cyber warfare; 
some experts noted that “the requirement only applies in circumstances in 
which the failure to have a fixed distinctive sign might reasonably cause an 
attacker to be unable to distinguish between civilians and combatants, thus 
placing civilians at greater risk of mistaken attack”). 
47 Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 61 (not-
ing that “openly” does not mean “visibly” or “ostensibly,” as “[s]urprise is a 
factor in any war operation . . .” In regards to weaponry, noting that “[t]he 
enemy must be able to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as 
members of regular armed forces, whatever their weapons.”). 
48 Id. (noting that “[T]he concept of the laws and customs of war is ra-
ther vague and subject to variation as the forms of war evolve.”). 
49 See Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irra-
tional Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror”, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 301, 306 (2003) (advocating a teleological approach to the 
Third Geneva Convention in light of its drafting history: “[b]ecause such nar-
rowing language was rejected, application of the provisions should be read 
broadly.”); id. at 303 (“[A] state’s freedom of interpretation within the Geneva 
Convention treaty regime is relatively broad, but is subject to general assent 
11
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With the flexibility of a teleological approach in mind, it is 
worthwhile to review emerging custom in the law of cyber-
warfare.  Because of its comprehensive nature, it is worthwhile 
to begin such a survey through the lens of NATO’s Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law of Cyber Warfare.50  The 
rules proffered in the Tallinn Manual “reflect consensus 
among . . . Experts as to the applicable lex lata, that is, the law 
currently governing cyber conflict.”51 The international legal 
scholars who published the Tallinn Manual did so to address 
concerns similar to those of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
to the Geneva Conventions; in applying International Law to 
the Information Age, these scholars noted that many interna-
tional customs developed prior to the advent of the computer.52  
Due to their intended status as an attempted ‘restatement’ of 
current custom in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello of 
cyber warfare, however, the rules in the Tallinn Manual do not 
proffer to “set forth lex ferenda, best practice, or preferred poli-
cy.”53  Thus, while it acknowledges that “the scope and manner 
of international law’s applicability to cyber operations . . . has 
remained unsettled since their advent,”54 and that “publicly 
available expressions of opinio juris” surrounding the issue 
“are sparse,”55 the Tallinn Manual may nevertheless provide as 
valuable an insight as any into the evolving custom that cur-
rently governs ‘the Law of Cyber-War.’56 
                                                          
from the international community, which may hinge on considerations of 
both international law and politics.”); Orna Ben-Naftali & Sean S. 
Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action: Lebanese Hostages in Israel, 41 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 185, 248 (2000) (advocating for a teleological approach to the Third 
Geneva Convention in the context of Lebanese guerilla combatants; arguing 
that the complementary nature of the Geneva Conventions “indicates the 
primary purpose of the Laws of War: to ensure that all people, combatants 
and civilians alike, who find themselves involved in an armed conflict, are not 
bereft of status and the protection their status bestows.”). 
50 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32. 
51 Id. at 5. 
52 See Collin Allan, Note, Direct Participation in Hostilities from Cyber-
space, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 175 (2013). 
53 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 5. 
54 Id. at 3. 
55 Id. at 5. 
56 See Manny Halberstam, Note, Hacking Back: Reevaluating the Legali-
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Rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual defines a “Cyber Attack” as 
“a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is rea-
sonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage 
or destruction to objects.”57  Note 2 accompanying the definition 
narrows it, stating that “[n]on-violent operation, such as psy-
chological cyber operations or cyber espionage, do not qualify as 
attacks.”58  Note 3 specifies further that generally, in determin-
ing whether a cyber operation is an ‘attack,’ the consequences 
of the operation are material to the determination; the nature 
of the operation, however, is not.59  Note 8 further suggests 
that some attacks that do not cause any physical damage may 
constitute ‘cyber attacks’ under Rule 30 in narrow circum-
stances: 
Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I [to the Geneva Conventions] 
prohibits ‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which 
is to spread terror among the civilian population.’  Since terror is 
a psychological condition resulting in mental suffering, inclusion 
of such suffering in this Rule is supportable through analogy.60 
In addition, intercepted attacks nevertheless qualify as 
‘cyber attacks’ under the Rule “if, absent such defenses, it 
would have been likely to cause the requisite consequences.”61  
Thus, a cyber attack need not be successful to be classified as 
such. 
                                                          
ty of Retaliatory Cyberattacks, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 199, 205 n. 42 
(2013) (noting that “[a]lthough the manual is not binding, its influence as a 
persuasive secondary source will be substantial.”); Harry P. Koulos, Note, At-
tacked by Our Own Government: Does the War Powers Resolution or the Law 
of Armed Conflict Limit Cyber Strikes Against Social Media Companies?, 11 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 736 (2013) (acknowledging the existing difficulty 
in definitively concluding the existence of customary norms in cyber warfare, 
yet adamant that “the Tallinn Manual Experts were unanimous in their con-
clusion that the current law of armed conflict applies to cyber operations.”); 
see also Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh 
Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 13, 15-16 (2012) 
(noting that the United States has taken “precisely the same position” as the 
Tallinn Manual on the applicability of the law of armed conflict to cyber op-
erations). 
57 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 106. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 107. 
60 Id. at 108. 
61 Id. at 110. 
13
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Rule 5 declares a State’s responsibility for cyber infra-
structure located within its territory or under its exclusive gov-
ernmental control.62  Rule 7 clarifies, however, that attribution 
of an attack to a State may not be predicated upon “[t]he mere 
fact” that a cyber operation’s place of launch or origination is 
within “governmental cyber infrastructure.”63  Presumably, 
once an attack meets this high threshold required for proper 
attribution, Rule 9 permits the State injured by the intention-
ally wrongful act of another state to resort to “proportionate 
countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against 
the responsible State.”64  As in the Law of War from which it 
derives,65 countermeasures taken in self-defense are “not lim-
ited to a State’s own territory.”66 
Rule 20 provides that “[c]yber operations executed in the 
context of an armed conflict are subject to the law of armed 
conflict.”67  The characterization of either “hostilities” under 
Rule 22 or “protracted armed violence” under Rule 23 “. . . may 
include or be limited to cyber operations,” as an international 
armed conflict.68 In addition, such characterization may apply 
in a non-international armed conflict.69  Under Note 16 to Rule 
22, “so long as the armed and international criteria have been 
met, an international armed conflict exists.”70  As regards a 
non-international armed conflict under Rule 23, Note 11 states 
that “[f]or a non-international armed conflict to exist, there 
must be at least one non-State organized armed group involved 
                                                          
62 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 26. 
63 Id. at 34. 
64 Id. at 36. 
65 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and securi-
ty.”). 
66 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 36. 
67 Id. at 75. 
68 Id. at 79; see also id. at 84 (explaining, at cmt. 15, that “The Interna-
tional Group of Experts unanimously concluded that cyber operations alone 
might have the potential to cross the threshold of international armed con-
flict.”).   
69 Id. at 84. 
70 Id.  
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/6
6  JAKE B  SHER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:54 AM 
2016 MODERN “CYBER-COMBATANTS” 247 
in the hostilities.  Such a group is ‘armed’ if it has the capacity 
of undertaking cyber attacks” under Rule 30.71  This standard 
appears to operate under a broad canon of construction, as a 
group’s ‘armed’ nature may be predicated solely upon its pos-
session of computer hardware and software sufficient to render 
it capable of executing a cyber-attack.72  This means that the 
possession of firearms and other kinetic weaponry is not a 
predicate requirement for a group to be ‘armed’ under the Tal-
linn Manual, which has implications with respect to Article 4, 
section 2, subsection c of the Third Geneva Convention.73  Note 
3 to Rule 22 notes that the question of whether the actions of a 
non-state may be attributed to another state such that the con-
flict is international was explicitly addressed in Prosecutor v. 
Tadic: 
[c]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or 
paramilitary units may be of an overall character . . . This re-
quirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of 
specific orders by the state, or its direction of each individual op-
eration.  Under international law it is by no means necessary 
that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of 
the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific 
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and 
any violations of international humanitarian law.  The control 
required by international law may be deemed to exist when a 
State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the 
conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the 
military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, 
training and equipping or providing operational support to that 
group.74 
                                                          
71 See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 88. 
72 See Steven G. Bradbury, The Developing Legal Framework for Defen-
sive and Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 591, 607 (2011) 
(noting that under customary international law, “if the cyber intrusion in-
flicts significant physical destruction or loss of life by causing the failure of 
critical infrastructure, like a dam or water supply system, then it obviously 
would constitute an armed attack under the law of war and would justify a 
full military response if it could be attributed to a foreign power.”). 
73 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4(2)(c) (“that of carry-
ing arms openly”). 
74 See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 80, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-
A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 137 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY, Jul. 15, 
15
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In addition, Rule 24 holds “[c]ommanders and other supe-
riors” to be “criminally responsible for “ordering cyber opera-
tions that constitute war crimes,”75  and “[m]ercenaries in-
volved in cyber operations do not enjoy combatant immunity or 
prisoner of war status” under Rule 28.76  These Rules clarify 
that international custom contemplates attacks initiated in cy-
berspace by state or non-state actors, and that such attacks 
have the potential to be ‘armed’ in nature. 
There are further complications, however, because navi-
gating bits and bytes in effectuating a cyber-attack can create 
similar collateral consequences to dropping a bomb, but the ef-
fects are different. While the intended target of a party drop-
ping a bomb may generally be extrapolated from the fallout 
surrounding the intended target, the intent of a party making a 
keystroke may have unintended consequences that are far-
reaching.77  The result is that the intent of the perpetrator with 
respect to such unintended consequences can be less clear, par-
ticularly if the cyber-attack causes sporadic or unforeseen 
damage to civilian targets.78  In such a situation, the principle 
of proportionality is likely to be of significant importance in de-
termining whether a violation of the jus in bello has resulted.79  
“[P]roportionality applies to the effects of the weapons on both 
noncombatants and combatants alike,” and enjoins combatants 
from directly attacking life and property of noncombatants, 
“although legal and moral attacks directed against proper tar-
gets may affect them.”80 
                                                          
1999). 
75 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 91. 
76 Id. at 103. 
77 See William J. Bayles, The Ethics of Computer Network Attack, 31 
PARAMETERS 44 (2001) (noting the far-reaching nature of cyber-attacks, and 
that “the greater the connectivity (defined as both the amount of external 
communications as well as the number of potential or habitual connections 
the machine uses), the more likely it is that the attack will reach unintended 
targets.”). 
78 Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ii), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“intentionally 
directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not mili-
tary objectives” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.). 
79 Bayles, supra note 77. 
80 Id.  
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Participation in a cyber-conflict requires its own nuanced 
analysis.  Rule 25 notes that no category of person is barred 
“from participating in cyber operations,” though “the legal con-
sequences of participation differ, based on the nature of the 
armed conflict and the category to which an individual be-
longs.”81  Rule 26, however, provides that members of the 
armed forces who are party to an international armed conflict 
“lose their entitlement to combatant immunity and prisoner of 
war status” upon failure to comply with the requirements of 
combatant status in cyber operations.82  It follows that the ma-
jority of the International Group of Experts who composed the 
Tallinn Manual took the position under Note 6 to Rule 26 that 
cyber-combatants who fail to comply with the Third Geneva 
Convention in executing cyber-attacks in an international 
armed conflict would lose their combatant status under the 
Convention.83  If the Third Geneva Convention applies, howev-
er, that also suggests that some terms that would be ambigu-
ous in assessing a cyber-combatant under it (such as “having a 
fixed sign recognizable at a distance” and “carrying arms open-
ly”) must have some meaning with respect to cyberspace opera-
tions—though the precise meaning remains unclear. 
It is clear, however, that if an international armed conflict 
exists under Rule 22, Note 16 of the Tallinn Manual, there 
must necessarily be combatants participating in that conflict.  
It is conceivable that a conflict solely involving cyber operations 
might potentially reach international armed conflict status un-
der Rule 22, Note 15.  Thus, Notes 15 and 16, read together, 
suggest that cyber units engaged in such activity may obtain 
‘combatant’ status when Rule 22 is met.  The question of the 
perpetrators’ “lawful” status as combatants when executing a 
cyber-attack presently falls to the Geneva Conventions and 
                                                          
81 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 95. 
82 Id. at 96. 
83 See id. at 97-98 (noting in addition that “[i]f a person engaged in cyber 
operations during an armed conflict is a member of an organized armed 
group not belonging to a party to the conflict, it does not matter if the group 
and its members comply with the four criteria of combatancy.  That person 
will not have combatant status and therefore not be entitled to combatant 
immunity or to be treated as a prisoner of war.  Such a person would be an 
‘unprivileged belligerent.’”). 
17
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surrounding principles of international law. 
III. A survey of sovereign states’ alleged cyber operations  
At this time, roughly 30 nations employ offensive cyber 
programs.84  Irrespective of whether the current state of cus-
tomary international law considers such programs to rise to the 
level of cyber-attacks, states (and groups acting on their behalf) 
have assembled formidable arsenals capable of executing dev-
astating and continuous cyber-operations in the field of cyber-
space.85  Units possessing significant cyber-capabilities include 
Israel’s Unit 8200 / C4i, the United States’ USCYBERCOM, 
Russia’s APT28,86 and China’s PLA Unit 61398.  While exam-
ples of state cyber-capabilities are certainly not limited in prac-
tice to those described herein, the states whose activities are 
                                                          
84 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What 
Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve 4 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-
centrifuge.pdf (noting that those nations include North Korea, Iran, Syria, 
and Tunisia). 
85 See Molly Bernhart Walker, Cyberwarfare underway ‘all of the time,’ 
says former NATO supreme allied commander, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (Oct. 
13, 2014),  
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/cyberwarfare-underway-all-time-
says-former-nato-supreme-allied-commander/2014-10-13 (quoting Gen. Wes-
ley S. Clark (ret.), recounting a meeting in 1994 where “a guy [at the meet-
ing] with a handcuff on his suitcase . . . open[ed] it up and sa[id] ‘this is real-
ly, really, really secret, but we could destroy a country’s electricity grid. Yes, 
without dropping a bomb’”); Adam Jourdan, China-U.S. cyber spying row 
turns spotlight back on shadowy Unit 61398, REUTERS (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-cybercrime-usa-china-unit-
idUSBREA4J08M20140520 (quoting an analyst from Mandiant, the U.S. 
cyber security firm who identified the location of PLA Unit 61398’s operations 
in China, as stating the discovery was only “the tip of the iceberg:” “I believe 
there’s an ongoing battle in the cyberspace. These countries are investing 
large amounts in cyber units that are able to create specific malware and 
have the ability to get into foreign networks and computers to steal trade se-
crets and intellectual properties.”). 
86 See Special Report: APT28: A Window Into Russia’s Cyber Espionage 
Operations?, FIREEYE 3 (2014), https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-
apt28.pdf [hereinafter FireEye APT28 Report] (stating that the APT28’s ac-
tivities are “the work of a skilled team of developers and operators collecting 
intelligence on defense and geopolitical issues – intelligence that would only 
be useful to a government. We believe that this is an advanced persistent 
threat (APT) group engaged in espionage against political and military tar-
gets including the country of Georgia, Eastern European governments and 
militaries, and European security organizations since at least 2007.”). 
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enumerated below have significantly shaped the cyber-
battlefield. 
A. Israel and Stuxnet 
The base at Urim in the Negev Desert that has formed the 
central node of Unit 8200’s operations remained invisible for 
decades, silently intercepting phone calls and e-mails passed on 
to other Israeli agencies, including the Army and the Mossad.87  
Nir Lempert, a reserve colonel and former deputy commander 
of Unit 8200, has outlined the unit’s recruitment policies: the 
brightest teenagers in the country are hand-picked, then 
trained to solve problems in multidisciplinary teams, where 
they are encouraged to think outside the military model.88 
In contrast to Unit 8200, Israel’s C4i Corps is a relatively 
recent arrival.89  Nevertheless, it has claimed to possess far-
reaching capabilities on the battlefield, from disruptions to 
command and control systems to more classified non-kinetic 
weaponry.90  C4i is a dynamic unit, and is currently in the pro-
cess of upgrading the entire IDF network, allowing for seam-
less communication on the battlefront.91 
                                                          
87 Nicky Hager, Israel’s Omnicient Ears, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Sept. 
2010), http://mondediplo.com/2010/09/04israelbase. 
88 Matthew Kalman, Israeli military intelligence unit drives country’s hi-
tech boom, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/israel-military-intelligence-
unit-tech-boom (“The central mission of the unit is to save lives, to prevent 
terror and other attacks,” says Lempert. “We teach our people that the mis-
sion is so important that there is no possibility of failure.”). 
89 Yaakov Lappin, Military Affairs: The IDF’s Secret Attack Force, 
JERUSALEM POST (May 11, 2013), http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-
Lines/Military-Affairs-The-silent-attack-force-312716 (quoting a senior source 
within the Electronic Warfare Section of the Corps as stating “[C4i] began 
small, and became large over the past decade. Now, it’s a monster . . .” and 
“The government instructed us to prepare and know how to operate [Elec-
tronic Warfare] in every operational arena.”). 
90 Id. (quoting the same source: “This is not a kinetic attack. The mission 
is not to destroy a target, to damage, or neutralize it, but rather to disrupt. 
I’m aiming at the enemy’s command and control. His management, organiza-
tion and commanders are the target . . .” but also noting that some activities 
are classified). 
91 Yaakov Lappin, Person of the Year in the IDF:  The C4i Corps, 
JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-
Thespotlight/Person-of-the-year-in-the-IDF-The-C4i-Corps-336472 (“The 
IDF’s C4i Corps is at the heart of a dramatic technological upgrade aimed at 
19
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Israeli cyber units may have participated in the creation of 
the infamous worm Stuxnet.92 An early version of the attack 
weapon manipulated valves on the centrifuges to increase the 
pressure inside them and damage the devices as well as the en-
richment process.93  The worm, which reportedly caused the 
failure of roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges by caus-
ing them to spin out of control,94 manipulated computer sys-
tems designed by Siemens, a German firm, infecting computers 
belonging to five outside firms believed to be connected with 
Iran’s nuclear program.95 All of the companies did business in 
industrial control and processing, either by manufacturing 
products, assembling components, or installing industrial con-
trol systems.96 While exactly how long it took Stuxnet to reach 
its target after infecting these corporate machines is unclear, 
between June and November of 2010, the number of centrifug-
es enriching uranium gas at the Natanz Nuclear Facility began 
to drop significantly.97 
Unlike any other virus or worm released before it, Stuxnet 
caused a physical impact on tangible equipment controlled by 
the computers it infected.98  While the attack by Stuxnet on 
Natanz was pinpointed and specific, its tactics and technology 
                                                          
achieving this vision. It has seen the IDF revolutionize its capabilities in a 
very short matter of time, and 2013 has been a key year for developments.”).   
92 See John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?_r=0 (quoting 
“[a] former member of the United States intelligence community” who 
claimed the attack “had been the work of Israel’s equivalent of America’s Na-
tional Security Agency, known as Unit 8200.”). 
93 Id. 
94 Michael B. Kelley, The Stuxnet Attack On Iran’s Nuclear Plant Was 
‘Far More Dangerous’ Than Previously Thought, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-
previous-thought-2013-11. 
95 Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digi-
tal Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-
to-zero-day-stuxnet/. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (noting a decrease of 328 centrifuges between June and August of 
2010, and a decrease of an additional 656 centrifuges between September and 
November, for a total decrease in 984 centrifuges; also noting that “although 
new machines were still being installed, none of them were being fed gas.”). 
98 See id.; see also Langner, supra note 84, at 4 (styling Stuxnet’s assault 
on Iranian nuclear centrifuges “a cyber-physical attack”). 
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are generic; the three-layer methodology used in them, consist-
ing of the worm’s propagation through IT systems, its manipu-
lation of Industrial Controls, and the requisite physical damage 
that results from such manipulation, has strong potential for 
use against other targets.99 
The Stuxnet attack has accelerated the propagation of 
cyber-capabilities in the Middle East region; in early March of 
2012, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, publicly 
announced the creation of a “Supreme Council of Cyberspace” 
charged “to oversee the defense of the Islamic Republic’s com-
puter networks and develop new ways of infiltrating or attack-
ing the computer networks of its enemies.”100  Simultaneously, 
Iran embarked on a $1 billion (USD) plan to develop technology 
and hire computer experts with the goal of boosting the Islamic 
Republic’s offensive and defensive cyber-warfare capabilities.101  
The 0xOmar Trojan, whose designer claims to be from Saudi 
Arabia,102 released the information of thousands of Israeli cred-
it cards in January of 2012.103  While the 0xOmar worm ap-
pears to be the product of a Wahhabi group rather than a gov-
ernmental directive,104 its origin is not confirmed.  Moreover, it 
                                                          
99 See Langner, supra note 84, at 4. 
100 Shane Harris, Forget China: Iran’s Hackers Are America’s Newest 
Cyber Threat, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/18/forget-china-irans-hackers-are-
americas-newest-cyber-threat/; see also Eric K. Shafa, Iran’s Emergence as a 
Cyber Power, STRATEGIC STUDIES INST. (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Irans-
emergence-as-cyber-power/2014/08/20. 
101 Yaakov Katz, Iran embarks on $1b. cyber-warfare program, 
JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Iran-embarks-
on-1b-cyber-warfare-program. 
102 AL ARABIYA, ‘Saudi’ hacker says Israel uncovered wrong person, vows 
deeper strikes (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/07/186810.html (reporting that 
the hacker, OxOmar, “vowed to send more files and more emails, adding that 
he was from Riyadh.”). 
103 Yaakov Lappin, Hackers post 1000s of Israeli credit card numbers, 
JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/International/Hackers-
post-1000s-of-Israeli-credit-card-numbers. 
104 Gianluca Mezzofiore, Anonymous Saudi Hacker OxOmar Second At-
tack on Israeli Credit Cards, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-hacker-oxomar-stages-second-attack-
israeli-277469 (quoting a statement posted on an Israeli sports website: “Hi, 
it’s OxOmar from group-xp, largest Wahhabi hacker group of Saudi Ara-
bia . . . “We are anonymous Saudi Arabian hackers.  We decided to release 
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highlights the widespread retaliatory response to Stuxnet in 
the Middle East.105 
B. USCYBERCOM and related U.S. Agencies 
The Army divisions that would integrate into what would 
ultimately become the United States Cyber Command have 
their roots in the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Com-
mand (STRATCOM).106  By 1968, STRATCOM numbered some 
49,000 personnel and provided “rapid, dependable, secure 
communications to military and civilian users around the 
world.”107  Ultimately, however, the systems managed by the 
heirs to STRATCOM (U.S. Army Communications Command in 
1973, replaced by U.S. Army Information Systems Command in 
1984) and their ultimate rededication to strategic signal ser-
vices, resulted in the decentralization and deregulation of 
command, control, communications, and computer (hereinafter 
C4) systems among Army Major Commands, causing serious 
compatibility issues for the Army’s IT/IS equipment and sup-
port networks.108  The negative impacts resulting from this in-
compatibility compelled the U.S. Army to re-centralize its C4 
systems starting in 2002.109 
By September 2006, it became apparent that computer 
network operations had begun to evolve into a larger mission 
set — cyberspace operations — and the Army directed for 
greater integration, coordination, and synchronization in Army 
computer operations to address risks in cyberspace.110  By July 
of 2008, the Army had activated its first provisional network 
                                                          
first part of our data about Israel.”). 
105 See generally Manny Halberstam, Note, Hacking Back: Reevaluating 
the Legality of Retaliatory Cyberattacks, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 199 
(2013). 
106 Vince Breslin, Network Enterprise Command evolved from Strategic 
Communications Command, ARMY COMMUNICATOR (Summer 2010), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Network+Enterprise+Command+evolved+fro
m+Strategic+Communications. . .-a0246535606. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Establishment of U.S. Army Cyber Command, U.S. ARMY CYBER 
COMMAND, http://www.arcyber.army.mil/history_arcyber.html#N1 (last visit-
ed Apr. 19, 2015). 
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warfare battalion under the U.S. Army Intelligence and Securi-
ty Command (INSCOM).111 
In June of 2009, United States Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates, commissioned the United States Cyber Command 
(“USCYBERCOM”) with the stated goal “to coordinate Penta-
gon efforts in the emerging battlefield of cyberspace and com-
puter-network security.”112  At the time, USCYBERCOM’s di-
rector, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, claimed that “[the 
establishment of USCYBERCOM] is not about efforts to milita-
rize cyberspace . . . [r]ather it’s about safeguarding the integri-
ty of our military system.”113 
While it is possible that USCYBERCOM’s initial goals may 
have been almost entirely defensive in nature, Iran’s develop-
ment of its nuclear program may have changed those goals – 
unofficially if not officially.  The New York Times reported on a 
covert U.S. program initiated by President George W. Bush and 
handed off to his successor, Barack Obama, after Israeli offi-
cials requested to fly over Iraq to reach Iran’s nuclear plant at 
Natanz.114  While 2010 saw a much subtler attack by Stuxnet 
taking much of Natanz out of commission,115 both Israeli and 
                                                          
111 Id. 
112 Thom Shanker, New Military Command for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES. 
(June 23, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/technology/24cyber.html. 
113 Mike Mount, U.S. Won’t Militarize Cyberspace, Nominee Says, CNN 
(Apr. 16, 2010, 12:04 PM), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/16/military.cyberspace/; see also Tod Leav-
en & Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International 
Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C.J.L. & Tech. On. 1, 2 (2010); cf. U.S. 
Cyber Command, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, 
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/2/Cyber_Command/ (last visited Apr. 19, 
2015) (proclaiming USCYBERCOM’s stated mission, among other elements, 
is to “. . . prepare to, and, when directed, conduct full spectrum military cy-
berspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure 
US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adver-
saries.”). 
114 David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nucle-
ar Site, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 10, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?scp=1&sq=janu
ary%202009%20sanger%20bush%20natanz&st=cse (reporting, somewhat 
cryptically, that “Several details of the covert effort have been omitted from 
this account, at the request of senior United States intelligence and admin-
istration officials, to avoid harming continuing operations.”). 
115 See Zetter, supra note 95.  
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U.S. officials proclaimed an official denial of involvement in the 
Worm’s dissemination.116 
The evidence pointing to U.S. involvement in Stuxnet is 
circumstantial at best,117 but there is much to suggest that the 
U.S. has developed strong offensive cyber-warfare capabilities.  
In October of 2012, President Obama issued Presidential Policy 
Directive 20, which lays out policies and procedures for “Offen-
sive Cyber Effects Operations” (hereinafter OCEO).118  The di-
rective places OCEO into three distinct categories:  “Cyber Op-
erations with Significant Consequences,” which require 
“[s]pecific Presidential approval;”119 “Threat Response Opera-
tions,” which provide a certain degree of departmental autono-
my, but require that “[t]he United States Government shall re-
serve use of such responses to circumstances when network 
defense or law enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot 
be put in place in time to mitigate the malicious cyber activity” 
and cautions that “departments and agencies shall conduct . . . 
responses in a manner not reasonably likely to result in signifi-
cant consequences.”120  In addition, the directive cautions de-
partments to “use the minimum action required to mitigate the 
                                                          
116 William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on 
Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagew
anted=1&_r=2&hp (reporting, in spite of the U.S. and Israeli denials, that 
“[b]y the accounts of a number of computer scientists, nuclear enrichment ex-
perts and former officials, the covert race to create Stuxnet was a joint project 
between the Americans and the Israelis, with some help, knowing or unknow-
ing, from the Germans and the British.”).  
117 Spencer Ackerman, With Stuxnet, Did The U.S. And Israel Create a 
New Cyberwar Era?, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2011),  
http://www.wired.com/2011/01/with-stuxnet-did-the-u-s-and-israel-create-a-
new-cyberwar-era/ (acknowledging that “Stuxnet’ s origin is unknown;” sub-
sequently stating that “[t]he Stuxnet whodunit may be solved: it appears to 
be a joint U.S.-Israeli collaboration — and a cyberwarfare milestone. The 
New York Times doesn’t have definitive proof, but it has fascinating circum-
stantial evidence . . .”). 
118 Presidential Policy Directive 20, Subject: U.S. Cyber Operations Poli-
cy (U), (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/07/obama-cyber-
directive-full-text; (June 7, 2013) (directing a new cyber operations policy; 
marked “Top Secret” and ordered to be declassified on Oct. 16, 2037). 
119 Id. at 9. 
120 Id. at 9-10.  
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activity.”121  “Emergency Cyber Actions” are to be conducted by 
either the Secretary of Defense or other department head au-
thorized by the President, with several caveats, including that 
they be conducted only when “necessary in accordance with the 
United States inherent right of self-defense as recognized in in-
ternational law to prevent imminent loss of life or significant 
damage” and “intended to be nonlethal in purpose, action, and 
consequence.”122 
U.S. military officials have acknowledged cyber-espionage, 
and cyber-attacks have heralded a revolutionary new era in 
military operations in which the United States cannot afford to 
be left behind.123  Undoubtedly, U.S. forces are developing both 
the defensive and offensive capabilities necessary to build and 
maintain advantages to protect its domestic and foreign inter-
ests as regards this potential new war front. 
C.  Russia and APT28 
If Israel and the United States in fact opened the war-front 
of cyber-warfare with the release of Stuxnet in 2013, it was 
Russia that fired the opening salvo five years earlier.  Weeks 
before the attack on Georgia in 2008 began, a security re-
searcher in Lexington, Massachusetts became aware of a 
stream of data directed at Georgian government sites contain-
ing the message “win+love+in+Rusia.”124  As early as July of 
                                                          
121 Id. at 10. 
122 Id. at 10. 
123 Mike Milord, Guard activates first cyber protection team, issues new 
shoulder sleeve insignia, ARMY.MIL (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.army.mil/article/136100/ (quoting a speech given by Army Maj. 
Gen. Judd H. Lyons during a ceremony on October 7, 2014, at which The Ar-
my National Guard’s first cyber protection team received its new shoulder 
sleeve insignia)  (“In 1775, the ‘shot heard round the world’ signaled the start 
of the American Revolutionary War . . . Today, 239 years later, we face a 
world in which the first shots of the next war may be fired in cyberspace. And 
unlike the shots fired in 1775, those shots may indeed be heard around the 
world, in a very real sense, as systems and components thousands of miles 
away are instantaneously disabled by a keystroke.”)  (Lyons stated further 
that) (“The billions of lines of code, massive server farms and cloud-based as-
sets that govern our power, water, fuel, communications, transportation, and 
national defense must be protected.”). 
124 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 12, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html. 
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2008, internet experts across the United States observed a re-
lentless barrage of distributed denial-of-service attacks that ef-
fectively shut down numerous Georgian servers in a prelude to 
wave of attacks that followed once the war began in earnest, 
originating from hosting centers controlled by Russian tele-
communications firms.125  One of the first Georgian websites 
that was attacked was a popular hacker forum. In perpetrating 
such an attack, Russian-supported hacker “militias” appeared 
to perpetrate a preemptive strike, attempting to prevent or 
mitigate “returning fire” from Georgian hackers.126  These mas-
sive digital attacks drove some of the government of Georgia’s 
websites offline during the Russian invasion. The attacks were 
termed by many net security experts to be the first overt act of 
cyber-warfare.127 
Naturally, Russia denied involvement in the computer-
related attacks.128  But the repeat use of similar measures in 
Russia’s conflict with Ukraine suggests that Mother Russia 
protests too much.”129  With the advent of the Ukrainian con-
flict, dozens of computer networks in Ukraine were found to be 
infected by a cyber-espionage “tool kit” called “Ouroboros,” or 
Snake, which bore uncanny similarity to a system that had at-
tacked classified systems at the Pentagon years before.130  This 
                                                          
125 Id. 
126 David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study:  Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS J., 
(Jan. 6, 2011), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-
hollis.pdf. 
127 See Cyber-attacks on Georgia Websites Tied to Mob, Russian Govern-
ment, L.A. TIMES: TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 13, 2008, 6:39 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/08/experts-debate.html; see 
also Michael Gervais, Cyber-attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 525, 579 (2012). 
128 Markoff, supra note 124. 
129 See William Shakespeare, The Tragedie of Hamlet, Prince of Den-
marke, in THE APPLAUSE FIRST FOLIO OF SHAKESPEARE IN MODERN TYPE 742, 
758 (2001) (Neil Freeman Ed.) (“The Lady doth protest too much methinks.”). 
130 David E. Sanger and Steven Erlanger, Suspicion Falls on Russia as 
‘Snake’ Cyberattacks Target Ukraine’s Government, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 8, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/europe/suspicion-falls-on-
russia-as-snake-cyberattacks-target-ukraines-government.html?; see also 
Fred Barbash, Cyberattacks on Ukraine bear Russian hallmarks, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/03/09/the-snake-cyberrattacks-on-ukraine-said-likely-to-come-
from-russia/ (describing the predecessor program to Ouroboros, called 
“Agent.Btz,” as “the most serious breach of the U.S. military’s classified com-
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appeared to fit with the typical Russian modus operandi: as 
one senior U.S. Intelligence official noted, “[t]he usual Russian 
approach would be to design something that could both conduct 
surveillance and aid in an attack.”131  Ouroboros does exactly 
that:  By targeting the Ukrainian government with Ouroboros, 
the Russians are able to effectively engage in an aggressive, 
kinetic act without actually declaring war, or other countries 
reacting like it is an act of war..132  “Snake” perpetrated a mas-
sive DDoS-attack on communication channels for the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Ukrainian state-
run news agency, the Ukrainian telecommunications system, 
and the mobile phones of members of the Ukrainian parlia-
ment.133 
The cyber-security firm FireEye has traced the Russian-
backed hacker group behind the attacks in Ukraine, dubbed 
APT28 (sometimes ATP28) by experts, to coordinated, sophisti-
cated digital attacks against NATO and the European Union.134  
Ultimately, APT28 planted its flag on the White House; U.S. 
officials, alerted to the breach by an ally, were able to mitigate 
the group’s activity, but not before the attack caused multiple 
service outages to unclassified White House networks and po-
tentially resulted in significant data theft.135  Nevertheless, no 
nation or organization has managed to directly attribute 
APT28 to the Russian government, much less reveal its true 
name or identity.  The closest anyone has gotten — publicly, at 
least — is the identification of the group’s regular activity in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg time zones, and the fact that its ac-
tivities further Russian governmental interests.136  The level of 
                                                          
puter systems . . . the Pentagon . . . discovered the rogue program infecting a 
classified network harboring some of the military’s most important secrets.”).  
131 Sanger, supra note 130. 
132 Alec Ross, Russia’s cyber weapons hit Ukraine: How to declare war 
without declaring war, WORLD POST (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alec-ross/russias-cyber-war_b_4932475.html 
133 Hillary Douglas, Cyber attackers target Ukraine’s government de-
partments, EXPRESS (Mar. 9, 2014), 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/463828/Cyber-attackers-target-
Ukraine-s-government-departments. 
134 FireEye APT28 Report, supra note 86, at 3-5.  
135 See Nakashima, supra note 13. 
136 Special Report: APT28: A Window Into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Op-
erations?, supra note 86. 
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coordination APT28 exercises, however, is strikingly similar to 
that of its counterparts in Israel and the United States.  Even 
assuming APT28 were not a Russian military unit, it is likely 
that they are operating with support from the Russian gov-
ernment. 
D. China and PLA Unit 61398 
In February of 2013, Cyber Security firm Mandiant re-
leased a report identifying an “advanced persistent threat” in 
cyberspace and designating that threat “APT1.”137  Mandiant 
tracked APT1 down to a 130,663 square-foot compound at 208 
Datong Road in Shanghai.138  China would have been no 
stranger to cyber operations; “[i]n late August of 2011, a state 
television documentary aired on the government-run China 
Central Television [that] appeared to capture an in-progress 
distributed denial of service attack by China’s military on a Fa-
lun Gong website based in Alabama.”139  Most commonly 
known by its Military Unit Cover Designator, PLA Unit 61398, 
APT1 is believed to have compromised 141 companies spanning 
20 major industries, stealing vast amounts of intellectual prop-
erty in the process.140  According to Mandiant’s report, Unit 
61398 “requires its personnel to be trained in computer securi-
ty and computer network operations and also requires its per-
sonnel to be proficient in the English language.”141  A 2004 no-
tice on Zhejiang University’s website “China’s People’s 
Liberation Army Unit 61398 Recruiting Graduate Students” 
[zh], stated that “Unit 61398 of China’s People’s Liberation 
                                                          
137 APT1:  Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, Mandiant 2 
(2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf. 
138 Charles Riley, The Cybercrime Economy: China’s military denies 
hacking allegations, CNNMONEY (Feb. 20, 2013, 3:52 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/20/technology/china-cyber-hacking-
denial/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (noting that a Chinese govern-
ment spokesman has criticized the report as “groundless both in facts and le-
gal basis” and “lacks technical proof” because it “relies too heavily on the 
tracking of IP addresses . . . that are stolen almost everyday”). 
139 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 820 (citing Ellen Nakashima & Wil-
liam Wan, China’s Denials on Cyberattacks Undercut, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 
2011, at A12). 
140 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note 
137, at 3. 
141 Id. 
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Army (located in Pudong District, Shanghai) seeks to recruit 
2003-class computer science graduate students.”142 According 
to the NSA, “China may have the capability to remotely shut 
down computer systems [belonging to] U.S. utilities, aviation 
networks, and financial companies”.143 
Mandiant revealed three identifiable individuals perpe-
trating the attacks, two of whom it identified using the same 
shared infrastructure, including Fully Qualified Domain 
Names (FDQNs) and IP ranges identified as belonging to 
APT1.144  The first persona, “UglyGorilla”, has been active in 
computer network operations since October 2004, and authors 
malware used in APT1 campaigns,145 when that persona regis-
tered the first domain name system (DNS) zone attributed to 
APT1 using both Shanghai and the “+86” international code in 
the registrant’s information fields.146  The second, “DOTA”, 
“has registered dozens of email accounts used to conduct social 
engineering and spear phishing attacks in support of APT1 
campaigns, us[ing] a Shanghai phone number [in] registering 
th[o]se accounts.”147  The third, “SuperHard,” “discloses his lo-
cation to be the Pudong New Area of Shanghai.”148  The file 
names in these hackers’ own digital weaponry suggest that 
English is a second language for the programmers.149 These 
and other APT1 personae appear to target emerging industries 
                                                          
142 PLA Unit 61398 Recruitment Notice Found, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/02/pla-unit-61398-
recruitment-notice-found/ (noting that the link to the recruitment post was 
available at the time the article was written.  The recruitment post is no 
longer available and redirects to a “not found” page as of Apr. 13, 2015). 
143 Edd Gent, China could shutdown critical US infrastructure, says 
NSA chief, E&T (Nov. 21, 2014), http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2014/nov/china-
cyber-infrastructure.cfm. 
144 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note 
137, at 5. 
145 Id. (noting that “UglyGorilla” publicly expressed his interest in Chi-
na’s “cyber troops” in Jan. 2004). 
146 Id. at 45-46. 
147 Id. at 5. 
148 Id. 
149 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note 
137, at 38 (noting language such as “No Doubt to Hack You, Writed by Ug-
lyGorilla” and “you specify service name not in Svchost\netsvcs, must be one 
of following” in the malware code’s tools). 
29
6  JAKE B  SHER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:54 AM 
262 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XX:N 
identified in China’s “12th Five Year Plan,”150 including infor-
mation technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, ad-
vanced materials, and biotechnology.151 
Close to a year after Mandiant released its report, a grand 
jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania “indicted five Chi-
nese military hackers for computer hacking” and related of-
fenses “directed at six American victims in the U.S. nuclear 
power, metals, and solar products industries.”152  The indict-
ment, which included “UglyGorilla” among its Defendants,153 
accused the defendants of hacking into several corporations 
with integral roles in U.S. infrastructure, including Westing-
house Electric Company, U.S. Steel, and Alcoa.154  In response, 
China “summoned the U.S. ambassador in Beijing, and warned 
it would retaliate if the U.S. followed through with the charg-
es,” and suggesting that the proceedings would damage mutual 
trust.155  There has been no further news since the indictment.  
Nevertheless, on April 1, 2015, President Obama signed an Ex-
ecutive Order allowing for the freezing of all property and in-
terests in the United States linked to computer compromise at-
                                                          
150 Id. at 59. 
151 See id. at 24 (noting information technology, aerospace, satellites and 
telecommunications, scientific research, energy, transportation, construction 
and manufacturing, and high-tech electronics among those hardest hit by 
APT1); see also Stephen S. Roach, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. 
Tactics, 5 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/China_12th_Five_Year_Plan.pdf 
(noting that China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan “focuses on the development and 
expansion of seven strategic emerging industries (SEIs): New-generation in-
formation technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, advanced materi-
als, alternative-fuel cars, energy conservation and environmental protection, 
alternative energy, and biotechnology.”). 
152 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military 
Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organi-
zation for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-
espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor. 
153 Indictment, United States v. Dong (2014) (No. 14-118), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf (cur-
rently under seal) (designating “UglyGorilla” as the alias for “Wang Dong”). 
154 Id. at ¶ 6. 
155 Adam Jourdan, China-U.S. cyber spying row turns spotlight back on 
shadowy Unit 61398, REUTERS (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-cybercrime-usa-china-unit-
idUSBREA4J08M20140520. 
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tacks, espionage, or other related disruptions.156 
As with APT28, direct ties between APT1 and PLA Unit 
61398 are tenuous and largely circumstantial.157  Individual 
Chinese perpetrators of cyber-espionage, however, appear to 
have been less successful in hiding their identities than their 
Russian, American, and Israeli counterparts.  On the other 
hand, attacks attributed to the Chinese appear to avoid choos-
ing foreign sovereigns as targets, more content with attacks on 
corporations or private firms a step removed from direct con-
tact with a sovereign state.  Nevertheless, it would be wrong to 
conclude that China’s trepidation in seeking out such direct 
contact means that its cyber unit or units would be any less ca-
pable in perpetrating a cyber-attack if it elected to pursue that 
option.158 
E. Analysis of Sovereign States’ Present Legal Liabilities 
Cyber units created by sovereign States are a prelude to a 
new dimension to combat support tactics executed through 
cyber warfare.  These sovereign States have envisioned both 
defensive and offensive means of utilizing this ‘new front’ in 
military operations.  Certainly, they may possess the capability 
to execute cyber operations that would constitute “acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror among the civilian population” as defined in Article 51(2) 
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.159  Like-
wise, they appear capable of measures that are “reasonably ex-
pected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or de-
                                                          
156 Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18077 (Apr. 1, 2015) (“Blocking 
the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-
Enabled Activities”). 
157 Zeljka Zorz, More (circumstantial) findings reinforce Mandiant’s 
APT1 claims, HELP NET SECURITY (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.net-
security.org/secworld.php?id=14522. 
158 See Ellen Nakashima, China testing cyber-attack capabilities, report 
says, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-testing-cyber-
attack-capabilities-report-says/2012/03/07/gIQAcJwDyR_story.html (noting 
Chinese cyber capabilities may rival those of the U.S.; reporting a statement 
by James A. Lewis, a cyber-policy expert with the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies: “if we get into any kind of a conflict with the PLA, 
cyber will be their opening move.”). 
159 A.P. I, supra note 38. 
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struction to objects” under Rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual.160  
While the question of attribution is a difficult one that likely 
shields sovereign states from liability in most instances,161 this 
paper’s analysis is confined to circumstances in which the in-
ternational community successfully attributes an attack to a 
state actor, and the “victim” state has captured the individuals 
perpetrating that attack. 
In such circumstances, the captives could be divided into 
two broad categories:  those who executed such attacks from an 
openly designated military complex under a command struc-
ture, and those who did not.  In cases involving “uniformed 
armed forces,” “militias,” and “volunteer corps that form part of 
those forces,”162 as is the case in some Israeli, American, and 
Chinese forces focused on defensive tactics, the calculus is, in 
theory, simple, provided members of those cyber-units are ap-
prehended in uniform and at a designated military site. 
The problem, however, is that cyber forces often operate 
out-of-uniform and from numerous discrete locations.163  The 
                                                          
160 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 106. 
161 See id. at 34 (noting, at Rule 7, that “[t]he mere fact” that a cyber op-
eration’s place of launch or origination is within “governmental cyber infra-
structure” is insufficient to meet the standard for attribution); see also Larry 
Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace 
Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011),  
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/ (“The 
hardest problem in finding the source of [cyber] attacks is attribution.”); Dim-
itar Kostadinov, The Attribution Problem in Cyber Attacks, Infosec Inst. (Feb. 
1, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/attribution-problem-in-cyber-
attacks/ (noting the consequences in the event of a hacker’s misidentifica-
tion). 
162 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4. 
163 See, e.g., James Stavardis, The New Triad, FOREIGN POLICY (June 20, 
2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/20/the-new-triad/ (“A U.S. Cyber Force 
will require a large civilian component and will need to be instinctively ori-
ented toward working with the interagency process and the private sector”); 
Christopher Paul, Isaac R. Porche III, and Elliot Axelband, THE OTHER QUIET 
PROFESSIONALS: LESSONS FOR FUTURE CYBER FORCES FROM THE EVOLUTION OF 
SPECIAL FORCES, Rand Corp., at 27 (2014), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR780/
RAND_RR780.pdf (noting that cyber operations “are best satisfied with a 
force that includes both uniformed and civilian personnel to appropriately ex-
ecute given authorities, and many CNO functions can (and should) be carried 
out from remote locations as part of reachback”). 
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Geneva Conventions were meant to apply to partisan forces,164 
not to the anonymities of warfare conducted over the inter-
net.165  An issue more analogous to those conventions might 
more reasonably arise concerning a ‘cyber-soldier’ or a ‘cyber-
partisan’ who perpetrates a cyber-attack while operating be-
hind enemy lines in a war zone.  Assuming that the individual 
is apprehended under the laws of war, the question would be 
whether the apprehended perpetrator is a lawful combatant 
under the Geneva Conventions.  Certainly, the apprehending 
state would argue that such an individual would fail to comply 
with Article 4, Section 2 of the Third Geneva Convention if that 
individual were out of uniform.  That is, of course, unless the 
individual operated in uniform and under orders while hiding 
out in a forest and hacking via a satellite internet connection or 
a local wi-fi signal.  Under those circumstances, assuming the 
cyber-soldier executed the attack in compliance with the laws 
of war, in which case she might argue that her computer could 
effectively be construed as an “openly displayed” armament, 
particularly if she is otherwise unarmed.  These unlikely cir-
cumstances, however, would constitute the only manner in 
which such a cyber-combatant might successfully argue for the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to her. 
Even when operating within his own state, a cyber-
combatant’s rights under the Geneva Conventions are at best 
unclear.  Attacks perpetrated by the Stuxnet Worm, APT1, and 
APT28 all appear to meet this model, at least in part.  In these 
cases, Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention poses serious 
problems if the individuals carrying out the cyber-attack act 
covertly, because such individuals might easily fall into the 
ambit of Article 4, Section 2.  Under that section, even individ-
uals following “the laws and customs of war” within a distinct 
command unit would have a difficult time proving that they 
possessed “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,” 
much less that they carried their arms openly; cyber-
                                                          
164 See Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 52 
(noting that in the course of World War II, an “abnormal and chaotic situa-
tion” arose “in which relations under international law became inextricably 
confused”). 
165 See Martin Libicki, Sub Rosa Cyber War 12-13 (noting marked differ-
ences between physical conflicts and those in cyberspace, particularly where 
cyber-combatants are “sheltered . . . in the anonymity of the Internet”).   
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combatants thrive on anonymity, and code in cyberspace does 
not move through the battlefield with the openness of a kinetic 
assault, such as a missile launcher or an M-16.  Moreover, if 
cyber units were to post their nation’s flag on the computer 
screens of a hijacked site prior to an attack, they would lose the 
element of surprise central to the effectiveness of attacks such 
as that by Stuxnet on Natanz.  The same would apply to cyber 
units posting their code (the closest thing to their “arms” that 
one can surmise in an electronic landscape) online prior to 
launching a barrage of bits and bytes; it would only serve to 
alert the enemy, which could then easily destroy that code or 
render it ineffective before launching a counterattack of their 
own against whatever sovereign nation had fired the opening 
salvo. 
It is of note that Mandiant’s data collection on PLA Unit 
61398 managed to record aspects of the malicious code and to 
decipher its contents.166  This assisted in determining the iden-
tities of the authors, sometimes as far back as 2004;167 it did 
not assist in determining, under the standard required by the 
Geneva Conventions, whether the authors flew a flag, wore 
their military uniforms, or carried any form of “arms openly” 
while they did so.  The same analysis should apply equally to 
the authors of Stuxnet or APT28’s activities. For these reasons, 
the time is nigh for a new Protocol concerning cyber operations 
perpetrated by sovereign state actors and their agents. 
IV. The unique problem posed by non-state cyber forces 
State actors have generally remained within the bounds (if 
tenuously) of what reasonably constitutes cybercrime or cyber 
espionage, rarely overreaching into the outright perpetration of 
a cyber-attack.168  Non-state cyber units, in contrast, are far 
                                                          
166 APT1:  Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note 
137, at 45-46 (attempting to identify PLA Unit 61398 hackers based on 
metadata and code written by them). 
167 Id. at 45. 
168 See Benjamin Zweifach, Plugging the Gap: A Reconsideration of the 
U.N. Charter’s Approach to Low-Gravity Warfare, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 379, 420 (2013) ( “[O]ne state’s encouragement of a guerilla, non-
state movement would rarely rise to the level of an easily demonstrable Arti-
cle 2(4) violation, simply by virtue of its less than kinetic conspicuousness . . 
.”), citing Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
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more likely to possess the incentive to perpetrate activities ris-
ing to the level of a cyber-attack under international legal 
standards.169  These groups, often already rogue in nature, may 
not view themselves as bound by international law, or worse, 
may not care.170  The most likely non-state actor to perpetrate 
such a cyber-attack is ISIL, whose foray into the realm of cyber 
warfare has resulted in several cognizable cyber operations 
against sovereign states, including France and the United 
States.171 
Admittedly, whether one may successfully attribute a link 
between ISIL and many groups professing loyalty to it is a ten-
uous gambit at best.172  Regardless, the dangers posed by ISIL 
may be more acute than other organizations because of its em-
brace of modern technology and its appeal to young, computer-
literate foreigners, including known hackers.173  At present, 
ISIL hackers might find targeted, Stuxnet-style attacks that 
bridge cyberspace and cause kinetic damage more challenging; 
such attacks require time and resources not currently available 
                                                          
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (1986). 
169 See Laurie R. Blank, International Law and Cyber Threats from Non-
State Actors, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 406, 407 (“The nature of today’s globalized and 
interconnected world combined with the extensive reliance on technology, 
computer systems and Internet connectivity means that non-State actors, 
whether individuals or groups of some kind, can have a significant impact 
through cyber activity.”). 
170 See Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland, The Islamic State is a Hybrid 
Threat: Why Does That Matter? SMALL WARS J. (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-islamic-state-is-a-hybrid-threat-why-
does-that-matter (noting ISIS’ disregard for international law). 
171 See, e.g., Lizard Squad Twitter Feed, supra note 16; Newsweek is lat-
est victim of the ‘Cybercaliphate,’ supra note 18; Martinez, supra note 20; Bill 
Chappell, French TV Network Hacked By ‘Cyber Caliphate’ Group, NPR.org 
(Apr. 9, 2015, 7:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2015/04/09/398492643/french-network-tv5monde-is-hacked-by-cyber-
caliphate-group (reporting that France’s TV5Monde went blank, replaced by 
the message ”Je suIS IS.”). 
172 Nakashima, supra note 13; Chappell, supra note 170 (“It’s not yet 
known what actual ties, if any, the [Cyber Caliphate] hackers might have to 
ISIS.”). 
173 Emma Graham-Harrison, Could Isis’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a 
deadly attack on key targets? Britain’s new spy chief has warned that we are 
in a ‘technology arms race’ with terrorists recruiting an army of hackers to 
their cause, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/12/isis-cyber-caliphate-hacking-
technology-arms-race. 
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to the group.174  Nevertheless, ISIL or another rogue fanatic 
group bearing a similar desire for sovereign statehood would 
find cyber warfare a tempting tactic for causing quick, high-
profile damage to a stronger, more established adversary.175  In 
the likely event that such an attack takes place in the future, 
there are several distinct possibilities:  first, the perpetrators 
may be directly, indirectly, or loosely affiliated with the group 
or unrecognized actor claiming statehood.  There may also be 
questions as to whether or not a conflict exists.  International 
Law would operate differently depending upon the nature of 
the permutations outlined above. 
A scenario that has the potential to cause widespread pan-
ic involves the internet of things.  Take, for example, the 
aforementioned scenario involving a cyber-attack on a military 
base.176  Suppose, in the above scenario, a cyber unit that has 
sworn allegiance to a group similar to ISIL infiltrates the ovens 
at several military bases operated by the same sovereign state, 
discharging the gas on each and turning on their pilot lights 
several minutes thereafter.  In an alternative scenario, the 
cyber unit might simultaneously overheat all of the base’s fur-
naces overnight.  Either situation causes a fire at the base, kill-
ing several hundred people.  The hackers claim responsibility 
after the attack two weeks later by placing a message and an 
animated .gif file of their flag on the website of the company 
that manufactures the devices. 
The state invokes the right to self-defense,177 then invades 
the region, capturing the hackers after tracking their IP ad-
dresses and internet footprint in a manner similar to that used 
in Mandiant’s  attempt to unmask PLA Unit 61398.178  At the 
time of their capture, the hackers in the unit are operating in 
                                                          
174 Id. 
175 See Oliver Rochford, Cyberwar: Breaching the Kinetic Barrier, 
SECURITYWEEK (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.securityweek.com/cyberwar-
breaching-kinetic-barrier. (“The risk of cyber-terrorism is of course far great-
er – religious and dogmatic fanatics and radicals may indeed wish to provoke 
such a conflict. But we have to try and differentiate between that, and actual 
nation-states taking potshots at another- activities with very little to gain in 
real strategic terms, but which could very quickly escalate.”). 
176 See Pesce, supra note 5. 
177 U.N. Charter art. 51, supra note 65. 
178 See APT1:  Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra 
note 137, at 45-46. 
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uniform out of an unmarked building in territory seized by the 
invading state.  Aside from their computers, of course, they are 
unarmed at the time of their capture.  The invading state de-
tains them as “unlawful combatants” in a temporary military 
base in the occupied territory.  The hacking unit’s commanding 
officer claims that he and the members of his unit are properly 
subject to treatment under the Geneva Conventions. 
The analysis under the Third Geneva Convention is likely 
to create more problems than solutions.  For the purposes of 
the proposed hypothetical, it can reasonably be assumed that 
an attack on military bases would be permissible under the 
laws of war, and thus the fourth prong of Article 4, section 2 of 
the Third Geneva Convention is met.  Since the hacking unit’s 
detention occurred in territory within the group’s direct or ef-
fective control, the members of the unit perpetrating the attack 
have a strong argument that they are “members of regular 
armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an au-
thority not recognized by the Detaining Power.”179 
The detaining state may attempt a counterargument, al-
leging that the manner in which the detained cyber-soldiers 
carried out their attack was sufficient to render it covert.  
Moreover, the detaining power may argue that the detainees 
would fail to meet the standards enumerated in Article 4, sub-
section 2 of the Third Geneva Convention; the attackers have 
not displayed any fixed signs recognizable at a distance, nor 
have they carried their arms openly in effectuating their at-
tack.180 The detainees may counter that recognizance at a dis-
tance is left “open to interpretation” and that posting their flag 
on a related website meets the standard in Article 4, subsection 
                                                          
179 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4, sect. 3. 
180 Id. at sec. 2.  What “carrying arms openly” entails with respect to a 
cyber-attack is anyone’s guess.  See infra Part II (noting the significant issues 
with respect to subsections (c) and (d) under Article 4, subsection 2 of the 
Third Geneva Convention); but see Milord, supra note 123 (noting a “new 
shoulder sleeve insignia” for a cyber protection unit).  A physical insignia is 
unlikely to meet the requirements of a “fixed sign recognizable at a distance,” 
however.  And regardless of whether the cyber-attackers adhere to the Gene-
va Conventions, the jus in bello may afford them no protection. See TALLINN 
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra 
note 32, at 97-98 (suggesting such fighters would be considered “unprivileged 
belligerents” not subject to the Third Geneva Convention).   
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2.181  The detaining state is likely to argue that the flag on the 
website is insufficient to meet that standard, to which the de-
tainees might respond by quoting Comment 11 to Rule 26 of 
the Tallinn Manual, which states the opinion of some in the 
group of experts that “the requirement only applies in circum-
stances in which the failure to have a fixed distinctive sign 
might reasonably cause an attacker to be unable to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants, thus placing civilians at 
greater risk of mistaken attack.”182  Because the attack was 
perpetrated solely against military targets, the detainees could 
argue, they were justified in carrying it out, and thus a fixed 
distinctive sign requirement does not apply.183 
There will also be a question as to whether the “carrying 
arms openly” standard is applicable to the detainees.  The de-
tainees may argue that their unit’s computers were used to 
perpetrate the attack, and thus constitute “arms.”  They may 
refer to the Tallinn Manual, which states that the unit is effec-
tively “‘armed’ if it has the capacity of undertaking cyberat-
tacks” (Rule 30).184  However, the detaining state will argue 
that the programs used in the cyber-attack are the “arms,” not 
the computers, and it is thus impossible for the unit to have 
carried a computer program “openly.”  A question of prevailing 
custom could arise, but because few cyber operations rise to the 
level of a cyber-attack under international law, and there is no 
consensus as to how a cyber-attack should be defined,185 nei-
ther side’s arguments are likely to prove entirely persuasive.  
The detainees would argue that the element of surprise, at 
least, is covered under existing law, and thus the openness of 
the “arms” used in the cyber attack is subject to a figurative, 
rather than a literal, interpretation.186  The detaining state 
could attempt to counter this argument by suggesting that due 
to the medium, the attackers were not reasonably recognizable 
                                                          
181 See Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 60. 
182 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 99. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. at 88. 
185 Pool, supra note 10, at 309; see also Kodar, supra note 10, at 124. 
186 Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 61 (not-
ing that “openly” does not mean “visibly” or “ostensibly,” as “[s]urprise is a 
factor in any war operation  . . . “). 
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in cyberspace at the time of the attack itself, whatever the na-
ture of their actual weaponry.187 Regardless, the detainees may 
have a strong argument that their international legal status is 
in doubt.  Thus, protection is warranted until a “competent tri-
bunal” determines the detainees’ status.188  At that tribunal, a 
fact-specific analysis about the nature of the detainees’ activi-
ties, the nature of their apprehension by the detaining power, 
and the nature of the conflict between the detaining power and 
the group to which the detainees belong is likely to become a 
factor in determining the detainees’ ultimate classification. 
In the above scenario, an indirectly or loosely affiliated ac-
tor would have a more difficult case.  In such a scenario, the 
question will be whether the actor’s affiliation with the detain-
ee is strong enough to implicate that the detainee “belong[s] to 
a party to the conflict.”189  Proving a connection may require 
analysis under the standard in Nicaragua v. United States, 
which held mere encouragement of an indirectly affiliated actor 
insufficient to constitute a violation of the jus ad bellum on the 
part of an encouraging state.190  On the other hand, “a role in 
organi[z]ing, coordinating or planning the military actions of 
the military group, in addition to financing, training and 
equipping or providing operational support to that group” is 
sufficient to result in that group’s liability under Prosecutor v. 
Tadic.191  Even under the Tallinn Manual’s rules, loose affilia-
tion may not be sufficient to shield the detainee from suffering 
under unlawful combatant status; depending upon the nature 
of their affiliation, the detaining power might term the detain-
                                                          
187 Id. (“The enemy must be able to recognize partisans as combatants in 
the same way as members of regular armed forces, whatever their weap-
ons.”). 
188 Id. at art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having 
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, 
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall 
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status 
has been determined by a competent tribunal.”). 
189 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4, sec. 2. 
190 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 168. 
191 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 137 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY, Jul. 15, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
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ees mercenaries, to whom the Manual affords no protection.192 
There a final wrinkle worth considering.  Suppose that in 
effectuating their attack, the detainees ‘accidentally’ acquired a 
handful of IP addresses for ovens or furnaces that were civil-
ian, not military, in nature.193  Suppose further that the result-
ing fires from those appliances caused widespread destruction 
and civilian deaths in an urban center a thousand miles from 
any of the unit’s military targets.  The detaining state would 
argue that the detainees violated Article 57(2)(a) of A.P. I, 
which requires planners to “take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, 
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”194  Thus, in 
perpetrating this attack, the detainees violated the laws and 
customs of war by targeting a civilian population.  The detain-
ees might attempt to counter that they had no intent to do so, 
that any resulting damage was collateral in nature rather than 
intentional, and that while “intentionally directing attacks 
against civilian objects” constitutes a war crime in an interna-
tional armed conflict, unintentional attacks do not.195   
Here, the proportionality principle will likely apply.  The 
question will be whether the proper rubric for analysis should 
be the proportional number of erroneously targeted IP address-
es, or the proportional amount of damage caused to civilian 
structures as a result of those erroneously targeted IP address-
es.  This is precisely the problem that existing treaty or custom 
does not anticipate; it will likely be a matter of first impression 
absent the establishment of some agreement or consensus re-
garding the issue. 
Irrespective of what the outcomes in these scenarios might 
be, the lack of governing law is troubling both for the detainees 
and for the detaining state.  Neither can be certain as to 
                                                          
192 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 103. 
193 See Laurie Segall, My hack stole your credit card, CNNMONEY (Dec. 
7, 2015, 3:38 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/06/technology/my-hack-
stole-your-credit-card/ (Recording the statement of a “grey hat” hacker: 
“Sometimes when you compromise something, you have access to a lot of oth-
er things in that same IP address space.”). 
194 A.P. I, supra note 38, at art. 57. 
195 Rome Statute, supra note 78, at art. 8(2)(b)(ii). 
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whether the Geneva Conventions will apply.  This lack of a 
clear demarcation of rights and responsibilities is a direct con-
sequence of the lack of treaty, custom, or other prevailing au-
thorities governing cyber conflicts; most arguments under in-
ternational humanitarian law are persuasive, not binding, 
upon the parties that first encounter each other in this new 
arena. 
V. Forward Into Cyberspace 
The time is ripe for a new convention on cyber warfare, be-
cause cyber operations are now the norm.196  Without clear 
rules of engagement, the impact on international humanitarian 
law will be significant.  Members of cyber units fighting on be-
half of both state and non-state actors are equally unsafe, be-
cause what precisely their “arms” might be is presently un-
clear, much less whether such arms may be carried openly 
when they conduct their operations against other sovereign 
states.  Moreover, what precisely would constitute affiliation 
with a state or non-state actor under the Geneva Conventions 
is a muddled question at best.  A detaining state may argue 
that the individuals perpetrating the attack were “lone wolf” 
attackers, or only loosely affiliated; a detained cyber-soldier 
may wish to bolster or deny his argument for connection with 
the entity on whose behalf the detainee operated; and the enti-
ty who encouraged or ordered the cyber-attack may have strong 
reasons to distance itself and disavow any connection.  The re-
sult is a potential loophole in international humanitarian law 
that detaining states may seek to use to their advantage. 
At the time when the international community enacted the 
Geneva Conventions, it faced a similar conundrum: how to deal 
with the sorts of ragtag militias and partisan groups that re-
sulted when previously sovereign states became occupied?197  It 
                                                          
196 See Jake Sher, A New UN Convention to Govern a New War Front?  
PACE INT’L L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://pilr.blogs.law.pace.edu/2014/10/21/a-new-un-convention-to-govern-a-
new-war-front/; see also Walker, supra note 85 (quoting Atlantic Council 
Board Director General Wesley Clark) (“We’re doing it all of the time. So is 
everybody else; because, I hate to say this, you can’t wait ‘til the next war to 
discover what the enemy’s cyber vulnerabilities are and what his nodes are.”). 
197 See Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 49. 
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chose to enact treaties that would protect those individuals, 
provided they met certain standards.  The international com-
munity faces a similar challenge in cyberspace today.  If, as the 
Third Geneva Convention’s drafters intended,198 it can use a 
teleological approach to clarify the proper means by which 
states must conduct cyber-attacks and operations, many of the 
problems that an armed cyber-conflict poses could be brought 
to easy resolution.  To await the question is ill-advised. 
The Tallinn Manual and most legal scholarship on the is-
sue of humanitarian law in cyber-conflict have presented more 
of a restatement of the present law than a true resolution.  
However, the Tallinn Manual poses at least one potential solu-
tion to the issue of what carrying arms openly in cyber warfare 
could mean.  Read together, Rules 22 and 26 suggest that 
members of the armed forces who are party to an “international 
armed conflict” rescind entitlements to combatant immunity 
and prisoner of war status when they fail to comply with the 
requirements of combatant status in cyber operations.199  Thus, 
the key to one’s status as a combatant may not be whether one 
is in uniform; it could turn, rather, on whether one adheres to 
the rules of engagement.  Given the nature of cyber warfare, 
this makes more sense than the present arrangement.  It is 
much easier to discern whether an individual has navigated 
within accepted rules of jus in bello in cyberspace, because 
their activities may be captured, tracked, or recorded using the 
patterns of data executed by their activities.200 
This legal standard would provide a strong enough eviden-
tiary requirement to protect those who follow the rules of en-
gagement, and to punish those who fail to do so.  More im-
portantly, however, the modern theater of war requires a 
significant improvement to the convoluted analysis that would 
apply at present under the Geneva Conventions. Absent a new 
standard governing the law applicable to cyber-combatants, ac-
tivities in the first cyber-conflict will likely be adjudicated in 
the same manner as those of partisans were in the wake of the 
                                                          
198 See id. at 61. 
199 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 79, 96. 
200 See, e.g., Barbash, supra note 130 (noting the use of a predecessor 
program to track such data).  
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